Not forgetting the safety case
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TMI2 happened because private sector owners cut costs and because managers became complacent and lazy. Humans being what they are, this can happen in any organisation, regardless of ownership. In most commercial organisations what happens when managers take their eye off the ball is that production gets inefficient, profits fall, and bankruptcy and unemployment ensues: the market exacting its fair toll. With nuclear power stations (and fuel storage depots and chemical production plants like Flixborough and Bhopal and various other highly-dangerous activities) what happens is that whole communities suffer; with nuclear, whole regions can be devastated as happened at Chernobyl.
It's important that we don't put too much reliance on the ability of humans to keep future reactors safe throughout their lifetime. (suppose a flu pandemic meant that most of the staff were off sick...). Nuclear reactors *can* be designed so that if you stop looking after them they just stop producing electricity. But most need active cooling systems to remove heat from the core, and when (as at TMI2) the backup cooling systems fail, catastrophic heat build-up, so-called meltdown, can ensue.
Generally, though, the nuclear industry has an excellent safety record; it and its engineers know more about radiation than anyone else so it treats it with due respect. What we as the public need to beware of is falling for the line that because it has a good record it is intrinsically-safe. It isn't; it depends on the competence of engineers to keep it so. Good engineering from the start will ensure that it is safe even when there are no more engineers.
Are railways 'intrinsically' safe? Hurtling lumps of metal around at 125mph seems intrisically dangerous to me.
I think most things we have and do have potential (intrinsic?) dangers, and safety depends on good design and engineering and perhaps vigilance. Is nuclear power any different?
Good engineering counts for a lot, but relying on vigilance doesn't seem to me to be enough.
So are you saying that nuclear plant are not designed like that? That if the Homer Simpson falls asleep the thing will melt down?
Re the second point, yes, I'm pretty sure this is the case (but relying to some extent on memory, so could be wrong). A reactor core produces heat which has to be removed by cooling systems (and the heat raises steam to generate electricty). If the heat isn't removed, it gets too hot. The only way to switch the reactor off is to put more neutron-moderating materials inside, which stop or slow down the chain reaction. PWR designs are mostly water-moderated; if pressure inside the reactor vessel falls, it turns to steam which is a much less effective neutron moderator. This is part of what happened at TMI-2, after the initial emergency coolant system didn't work properly because the feed valves were closed for maintenance. Chernobyl was graphite-moderated and gas-cooled; when air got into the coolant circuit, the graphite started burning.
So anyway, because nuclear plant aren't failsafe like train braking systems they use multiple redundancy, which is - imho - a second-best, and one that I'm very uneasy about.
Except that according the the American Nuclear Society "The average radiation dose to people living within 10 miles of the plant was eight millirem, and no more than 100 millirem to any single individual. Eight millirem is about equal to a chest X-ray, and 100 millirem is about a third of the average background level of radiation received by U.S. residents in a year."
Then there was that terrible Windscale incident, which resulted in the destruction of some milk.
Chernobyl aside, there have been a handful of deaths at nuclear plants, often related to fires. I cannot believe that this is any greater than the number of deaths due to work-related accidents at Gas, Coal or Oil-fired power stations. Sooner or later some clumsy oaf will be hit by a revolving wind turbine, but I hope nobody will then start demanding we abandon wind energy.
In fact the comparison with wind and nuclear is instructive: one is now and one was in the 50s and 60s fashionable technologies of dubious economic worth. The difference between them is that nuclear can at least generate a decent amount of reliable energy.
TMI2 turned out OK in the end, it's true. Even with complacent plant managers, the catastrophic leak of radiation was prevented. Harrisburg remains a viable community. But it could have been much worse; indeed, it came very close to being much worse.
So far, in the history of nuclear power, there has been only one really serious accident, Chernobyl, and that was with a reactor design
no one would consider building today (and nor would they have then, in an open society). But TMI2 remains a pertinent example of the institutional failings that can happen, and why it's dangerous to rely on any system of active safety management.
This isn't a wholly anti-nuclear case - it's a case for further refinement of nuclear design, so that reactors really are fail-safe. That is, when they break, they shut down safely. It's also a case for openness with technology, which leads to the other main case against nuclear power generation - its close links with nuclear weapons.